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retit·ecl after the same length of service.
under this assumption, a member discharged
30 years might, by the terms of section 5, be
pension amounting to 30/25 of one-half of his
since the section authorizes a pension ''in the prothat the number of years he has served . . . bears to
years.'' On the other hand, a person who
retired under section 2
after being employed for 30 years
receive a pension amounting only to half his salary.
If there is any doubt as to the proper interpretation
the ordinance, we are, of course, required to construe the
liberally in favor of the applicant so as to carry
their beneficent policy. (See Terry v. City of Berkeley,
Cal.2d 698, 701-702 [263 P.2d 833] ; England v. City of
Beach, 27 Cal.2d 343, 346-347 [163 P.2d 865]; Gibson v.
of San Diego, 25 Cal.2d 930, 935 [156 P.2d 737] .) We
conclude that section 5 is not applicable to plaintiff and that
is entitled to a pension under section 2 (a).
'fhe judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Carter, ,T., Schauer, .T., Spenee, J., and McComb,
concurred.

[S. F. No. 19492.

In Bank.

June 28, 1956.]

SADIE I. SUTTON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDEN'r COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
Workmen's Compensation - Continuing Jurisdiction Over
Awards.-The continuing jurisdiction given the Industrial Accident Commission over its awards by Lab. Code, § 5803, includes the right to diminish, increase or terminate, within
the limits mentioned in the workmen's compensation laws, any
compensation awarded on the ground that the disability of
the person in whose favor the award was made has recurred,
increased, diminished or terminated, but such power is qualified by § 5804, declaring that no award of compensation shall
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 160; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 484 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Workmen's Compensation, § 203;
Workmen's Compensation, § 141; [3] Workmen's Compensa§ 205; [5] Statutes, § 180(2); [6) Workmen's Compensation,
203, 205.
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mission may act on such proceedings commenced within five
years.
!d.-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Awards-Time When Power
May Be Exercised.-Lab. Code, § 5804, does not prescribe the
time within which proceedings to amend or rescind an award
of the Industrial Accident Commission may be commenced
but flatly declares that no award "shall" be rescinded 0 ;
amended after five years from the date of injury, and this may
not be construed as allowing five years in which application
for relief may be made or as allowing the commission, in case
a petition to amend the award is made next to the last day
of the five-year period after the injury, to act on the petition after such period has elapsed. (Disapproving contrary
language in Larsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 125 Cal.App. 13,
13 P.2d 850.)
[4] !d.-Continuing Jurisdiction Over Awards.-A proceeding on
application by the employer's carrier to amend an award of
the Industrial Accident Commission may not be taken under
Lab. Code, § 5410, relating to new and further disability, but
must necessarily be instituted under §§ 5803, 5804, since § 5410
refers only to a proceeding by the "injured employee."
[5] Statutes-Construction-Departmental Construction.-A for·
mer administrative construction contrary to statutes cannot
control.
[6] Workmen's Compensation - Continuing Jurisdiction Over
Awards.-The fact that a different period of time is given to
injured employees in which to file an application for new
and further disability (Lab. Code, § 5410) than to employers
or their carriers ( § 5804) in which an award of the Industrial Accident Commission may be altered does not "v'"""''""'"'
a denial of due process and equal protection of the law
Const., 14th Amend., § 1; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 25,
§§ 11, 21), since there are manifest differences between an
jured employee and his employer and the employer's """"""'u'o"
carrier on which the Legislature could base a
classification.
[2) See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 134;
Workmen's Compensation, § 409.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 152; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 319.
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an injnrcd
Award annulled.
for Petitioner.
Daniel C.
lVIullm & Pilippi for Hespondeuts.
,J.~On April 2, 1948,
IYas
the eourse of her employment, and on March 14,
Accident Commission awaeded her a
rating of 100 per eent. On April 1, 196~!. the 1wxt
to the last day of the five-year period after the injury, her
's insuranee earrier filed a petition with the eommisto lmve the award amended to reduce the percentage of
JWrmanent elisa bility. After proceedings were had the commission set aside its a·ward and ordered that petitioner's
permanent disability be reduced to 411/~ per cent.
Petitioner seeks to have the last mentioned order annulled.
on the grounds that: (1) The commission was without
clietion to make the order after the five-year period under
workmen's compensation laws (Lab. Code, § 5804); (2)
1949 amendment (Stats. 1949, ch. 677, § 2) to section 5804
which increased the period of time from 245 weeks to five
years should not be retroactively applied to the instant proceedings;
the findings of the commission do not support
order sought to be annulled. In view of the result reached
herein that the commission should not have made the order
after the expiration of the five-year period and that the order
must be annulled on the first of the grounds heretofore set
it is unnecessary to discuss the other contentions.
Section 5803 of the I1abor Code provides generally
that the commission has continuing jurisdiction over its
awards and at any time upon notice and opportunity to b<~
heard it may rescind, alter or amend snch award, good
appearing therefor. 'l'his power includes the right
to diminish, increase or terminate, within the limits mentioned in the workmen's compensation laws, any eonqwnsatim1
awarded on the ground that the disability of tht, person in
favor the award was made has t'<'eurrcd.
diminished or 1Prmillated. '!'hat section is q11alified, howby section 6804 which reads: ''No a ward of compcmmtion shall be rescinded, altered, or amended after five years
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from the date of the
Provided, however, that
an award has been made finding that there was employment
and the time to petition for a rehearing or reconsideration
or review has expired or such petition if made has been
determined, the commission upon a petition to reopen shall
not have the power to find that there was no employment."
(See St~bseqnent Injuries FnnrZ v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 39
Cal.2d 83
P.2d 889].) 'fhere is another provision which
should be considered in connection with section 5804. Section
5410 of the Labor Code provides: "Nothing in this chapter
shall bar the right of any injured employee to institute
proceedings for the collection of compensation within five
years after the date of the injury upon the ground that the
original jnjury has caused new and further disability. The
jurisdiction of the commission in such cases shall be a continuing jurisdiction at all times within such period. This
section does not extend the limitation provided in Section
5407.'' The ''chapter'' referred to is that dealing with
"bmitations of Proceedings" commencing with section 5400.
[2] The commission claims that inasmuch as the carrier's
upplication to amend the award was filed with it within the
fivc-yrar period, the commission could make the amendment
after the five years had expired. It has been held in considering scchon 5410, sttpra, that an application by an employee for new and further disability, if filed within the fiveyear period, is timely and the commission may determine
the question after the expiration of the period. (Gobel v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 1 Cal.2d 100 [33 P.2d 413] ; Fttrness
Pacific, Ltd. v. Industrial Ace Com., 74 Cal.App.2d 324 [168
P.2d 7611; Hcnr·y Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 211 Cal. 154 [294 P. 703, 72 .A.J_..l=t. 1118] ;
IVestvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 186 Cal.App.2d
GO [288 P.2d 300] ; Pacific Indcrn. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
85 Cal.App.2d 490 (193 P.2d 117]; see Douglas Aircraft Co.
\'.Industrial Ace. Cmn., 31 Cal.2d 853 [193 P.2d 468].)
This holding is in accord with the express wording of
section 5410, S1tpra. 'l'hat section provides that an
jured employee'' may ''institute,'' that is, commence ur<Jce,ed·
ings for eompensation within five years after the date of
injury on the ground that the original injury has
11\~W and fmther disability.
There is no restriction on
time within whicl1 the commission may act, hence it
act on the proceedings commenced within the five
after the five years have elapsed. Section 5410 is in
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the other lwud, scdiol!s fioO:J an(l
snp1·a,
are
in i he instant ease, are in ilw
of
eode
with "Findings and Awards' and there is
in section GB04 about the time within which
to amend or r(,:-;eind an award may be comnwnced. 'l'he
is a fiat declaration i hat no award "shall'' be
reseiudt•;l or ammJded after five years from the date of
'J'hc differeut lauguage in the two sections (54] 0
alld 51l04) indicates that a different rule was intended. \Vlwn
!Jegislature intended that a proceeding was timely when
eommenced within the period, even though decided later,
it so stated (!Jab. Code, § 5410, supra). Its failure to so
in section 5804 indicates that it did not intend the
~a me result. t
It is true that the foregoing interpretation
or section 5804 means that five years' time is not given in
which to apply for relief under section 5803, because obviously
application on a date such as the next to last day could not
be decided until after the time limited, but section 5804
docs not purport to allow five years in which application may
b,; made for relief (as does § 5410). On the contrary, it
provides that the commission may not amend or rescind its
award after that time.
'rhe distinction between the two sections was recognized
in W estvaco etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., S1tpra, 136
CaLApp.2d 60, 63, where the court, after stating that the
was whether the proceeding was under section
5JrJO or 580:5 and 5804, said: '"l'he petition of April 9, 195i5,
barred by the provisions of section 5410 expressly limitthe time within whieh a petition for new and further
disability may be :filed to five years after the injury. If
the commission were attempting to exercise under section
5803 a continuing jurisdiction to amend or alter an order,
order amending would be void because of the limitation
of such power expressed in section 5804. . . . The commission,
within the five-year period, is authorized by section 5803 'to
5804) has been said to be a jurisdictional limitation. (Douglas
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 31 Cal.2d 853, 855.)
~,Compare section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides
that an application for relief from default must be made in six months
and section 660 which provides that the court has no power to pass
on a motion for a new trial after 60 days after notice of entry of
judgment, etc.

.Juw

[5
under
there was new and further uu'i:tiJ'lHLv
then make an award therefor This latter award
made after the expiration of the '"'"''-"'
for it had been :filed within that period.
"It is well settled that the commission has power to continue its jurisdiction to determine new and further disability
the
period, where application is made within
3

"

''If the true and exclusive meaning of section 5410 is
that there can be no new and further disability application
where there was a permanent disability award, then the
employee here must be denied any increase in permanent
disability over the percentage found in the :first order, bel;ause the commission failed to amend that order within the
:five-year period and his present condition does not constitute
'new and further disability' within the meaning of that
section. . . . During the :five-year period the commission
could under section 5803 amend or alter its previous order,
or could act under section 5410. After the five-year period,
only section 5410 can be used, and then, only if a prior proceedis filed ttnder it!' (Emphasis added.) (See also Broadway-Locust Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 92 Cal.App.2d 287
l206 P.2d 856] ; Ftwness Pacific, Ltd. v. Indttstrial Ac<i. Com.,
supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 324.) DougLas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial
Ace. C01n., supra, 31 Cal.2d 853, while not entirely clear,
merely follows Gobel v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 1 Cal.2d
100 (decided under the earlier version of § 5410) which held
that the commission could pass on an application for new
and further disability after the specified period if the application was :filed within it. Larsen v. Industrial Ace. Com., 125
Cal.App. 13 [13 P.2d 850], is distinguishable but the language
therein contrary to the foregoing interpretation is hereby
disapproved.
[4] In the instant case the proceeding could not have
been taken under section 5410 because the employer's
filed the application. It was necessarily under sections
and 5804. Section 5410 refers only to a proceeding by
"injured employee." By no device may that phrase
held to include an employer or his carrier.
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insurance carrier
of the sections discussed
given to them by the commission. That
to
but in any event, a former administrative
to the statutes cannot eontrol.
40 Cal.2d 751
P.2d
Thr carrier urges that the i'n>•ocr.mn
dne proerss and
different period of time is
than to employers or their carriers
in which an award may be altered. There are manifest
bet\veen an
and his
the latter's insurance carrier upon which the "'~""'o'u
base a reasonable classification. 'fhe whole
of workmen's compensation laws recognizes such a distinction.
The distinction has been made in statutes regulating attorue,v 's
which have been upheld. (See Marezeski v. Pittsburgh
Steel 01·e Co., 154 1\linn. 536 [191 N.W. 743]; Marshall v.
81 Cal.App. 98 [252 P. 1075]; Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass.
[17!1 N.E. 684, 79 A.IJ.H. 669]; ]'{orman's Cnsr, 278 Mass.
[180 N.E. 288, 82 A.I1.R. 885] .)
awal'(1 is annulled.
tM·n>·<>t"t·,r.n

:\l

<iibson, C. .T., Shenk, ,J., Schannr,
.J., concurred.

.f., and

The petition of' respondent GuaranUcr' lnsnnw<·<: Company
fo1· rPtJearing was rlenie<1 ,Jn l,v 24, ] D56.

\H. R. Const., Fourteenth Amendment, §]; soc Cal. Const., art. VI,
art. I, §§ 11, 21.)

